Stop Treating Korea Likea “Fixed Aircraft Carrier” in Washington’s Asia War Plans 한국은 미국 전쟁 수단인 ‘고정된 항공모함’이 아니다

At the May 2025 LANPAC Symposium in Honolulu, the newly appointed Commander of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), Gen. Xavier T. Brunson, made a comment that is reverberating across East Asia. Speaking to a room of U.S. military and defense industry officials, Brunson stated that the U.S. military presence in South Korea is not only to deter North Korea, but also to counter China as part of the broader U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. Strikingly, he described Korea as “an island or a fixed aircraft carrier” positioned between Japan and mainland China.

While the remark may have been intended metaphorically, its implications are serious. For South Koreans and regional observers, it represents a concerning shift in how the U.S. views its alliance with Seoul—not as a mutual defense partnership rooted in shared security interests, but as a strategic outpost in America’s long-term competition with China.

Strategic Overreach?

The framing of South Korea as a static military asset raises troubling questions. Does the alliance now serve Korea’s national defense—or is it becoming a platform for broader U.S. strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific?

As the United States expands its deployment of advanced unmanned systems and strategic assets in Gunsan, it is sharpening deterrence capabilities aimed squarely at China. This is the tangible expression of what General Xavier T. Brunson called “strategic flexibility.” With the role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) extending beyond the Korean Peninsula to encompass potential operations in Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, South Korea now finds itself on the frontlines of America's encirclement strategy against China.

But behind the comforting rhetoric of the U.S.–ROK “alliance” lies a far more uncomfortable truth: Korea is not a partner, but a military subordinate. Since liberation in 1945, Korea has remained under overwhelming American military influence. The 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, while ostensibly a pact of mutual support, primarily served to justify the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Korea. In practice, it has kept South Korea tethered to U.S. strategic interests.

Today, more than 30,000 U.S. troops are stationed on Korean soil. Operational control (OPCON) of wartime forces remains in American hands, symbolized most starkly by the fact that the commander of the Combined Forces Command is a U.S. general. Beyond strategic dependence, South Korea bears immense economic burdens: it funds over $500 million annually in military construction, covers 85% of personnel costs, and continues to provide prime real estate for U.S. bases.

If the U.S. intends to mobilize USFK in the event of a contingency over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, Korea’s proximity to China and its hosting of major U.S. bases could draw it into a conflict it neither started nor consented to. Bases in Pyeongtaek, Osan, and elsewhere could be among the first targets in any escalation. For policymakers, this highlights an uncomfortable truth: a shift in USFK’s mission from deterrence to regional power projection risks compromising Korean sovereignty, security, and democratic control over foreign policy.

A Question of Costs and Consent

South Korea currently contributes over 1.5 trillion won (approximately $1.18 billion USD) annually toward hosting U.S. forces. These payments were justified under the premise that USFK served Korean national defense interests. But if USFK’s mission is now increasingly global—supporting Indo-Pacific operations or deterring China more broadly—the terms of that contribution must be reconsidered. No democratic society should be expected to subsidize a foreign military for purposes beyond its borders, particularly without full transparency and consent.

Moreover, recent developments in defense-industrial cooperation between Korean firms and U.S. military logistics suggest a growing entanglement. South Korean companies, including Hanwha Ocean, have expanded into U.S. naval support sectors, raising concerns that Korea’s world-class shipbuilding and technology industries may become overly integrated into the American defense economy—at the expense of domestic priorities.

South Korea’s defense industry, too, is increasingly dependent on U.S. platforms such as the F-35, Patriot missile systems, and Aegis combat systems. The case of Hanwha Ocean servicing U.S. Navy transport vessels shows how deeply Korea is now embedded in the American military supply chain. This is not the foundation of an equal alliance—it is the infrastructure of subordination.

At the root of this subordination is Korea’s geopolitical value. U.S. officials have long referred to Korea as a “dagger aimed at the heart of the continent”—a forward base in strategies not just against China, but also Russia. Brunson’s recent remark likening Korea to a “fixed aircraft carrier” reveals the raw truth: in the eyes of Washington’s war planners, Korea is a launchpad, not a partner.This trajectory places Korea in grave danger. Should conflict erupt over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, Korea—due to its proximity and its U.S. bases—could be dragged into a war it neither initiated nor desires. The lives and safety of the Korean people should not be treated as collateral to American strategic calculations.

A Sovereign Nation, Not a Staging Ground

What is urgently needed is a shift in consciousness. Korea must reject the status of a military vassal and assert its right to self-determination. True national defense means breaking free from this military dependency and pursuing balanced diplomacy with neighboring powers. National sovereignty is not an abstract ideal—it is a necessity for the survival and dignity of the Korean people.It is time for Korea to step out from under the shadow of American strategy and chart its own future—one decided by Koreans, for Koreans.

Korea is not an aircraft carrier—it is a democratic republic with its own strategic interests, public opinion, and constitutional processes. Framing it otherwise, even metaphorically, obscures the reality that true alliances must be grounded in equality, not expediency.

For international policymakers, Korea’s experience underscores the broader challenge facing U.S. alliances in the 21st century: how to maintain credible deterrence without replicating the dynamics of dependency, imbalance, or unilateralism. As global power competition intensifies, alliances must evolve carefully—not by default, but by deliberate, inclusive dialogue. The stakes—for peace, for sovereignty, and for the rules-based international order—are too high for anything less.

한국은 미국 전쟁 수단인

‘고정된 항공모함’이 아니다

주한미군의 역할을 다시 생각해야 할 때

2025년 5월, 하와이 호놀룰루에서 열린 LANPAC 심포지엄에서 새로 임명된 주한미군 사령관 자비에르 T. 브런슨 대장이 충격적인 발언을 내놓았다. 그는 주한미군이 북한 억제를 넘어 미국의 인도-태평양 전략 속에서 중국을 견제하는 역할을 수행한다고 밝히며, 한국을 “일본과 중국 본토 사이에 위치한 섬 또는 고정된 항공모함”으로 묘사했다.

이 비유는 단순한 수사가 아니다. 한국과 동아시아 지역에서는 미국이 한미동맹을 상호 방위 동맹이 아닌, 중국과의 전략 경쟁에서 ‘전략적 전초기지’로 보고 있다는 우려가 커지고 있다.

한국을 ‘고정된 군사 자산’으로 보는 시각은 심각한 문제를 제기한다. 현재 한미동맹은 정말로 한국의 국가방위를 위한 것인가? 아니면 미국의 인도-태평양 전략 확대를 위한 수단인가? 만약 미국이 대만이나 남중국해 위기 상황에서 주한미군을 동원한다면, 중국과 국경을 맞대고 있는 한국은 자국 의사와 무관하게 분쟁에 휘말릴 수밖에 없다. 평택과 오산 등 주요 미군기지는 분쟁 시 최우선 공격 대상이다.

이는 한국의 주권과 안보, 그리고 외교 정책에 대한 민주적 통제권을 위협하는 문제다. 억제에서 ‘역내 무력 투사’로 임무가 변질된다면, 한국은 더 이상 ‘동맹’이 아닌 ‘전략적 교두보’에 머물게 될 것이다.

한국은 이미 매년 1조 5천억 원이 넘는 금액을 주한미군 주둔비로 부담하고 있다. 이 비용은 주한미군이 한국 안보에 기여한다는 전제 하에 정당화돼 왔다. 그러나 임무가 글로벌화되고 대중국 견제에 집중된다면, 국민 동의 없는 분담금 부담은 재고되어야 한다. 민주주의 국가가 자국 외부의 전략 목적을 위해 외국 군대를 지원하는 것은 결코 정당화될 수 없다.

더욱이 최근 한국 방산업체들이 미국 해군 지원 사업에 깊숙이 관여하는 상황은, 한국 산업이 미국 방위산업에 과도하게 종속될 위험성을 보여준다. 조선과 첨단기술 분야에서 세계적 경쟁력을 가진 한국이 국내 우선순위를 희생하면서까지 미국 군수경제에 통합되는 것은 경계해야 할 사안이다.

한국은 항공모함이 아니다. 민주공화국으로서 한국은 고유한 전략적 이익과 국민 여론, 헌법적 절차를 가진 주권 국가다. ‘고정된 항공모함’이라는 비유는 동맹의 본질을 흐리게 한다. 진정한 동맹은 편의주의가 아닌 평등에 기반해야 한다.

한국의 사례는 21세기 미국 동맹체제가 직면한 근본적 도전을 상기시킨다. 어떻게 신뢰받는 억제를 유지하면서도 의존성과 불균형, 일방주의를 피할 수 있을까? 심화되는 글로벌 경쟁 속에서 동맹은 자명한 사실이 아니라 신중한, 포괄적 대화를 통해 재정립되어야 한다. 평화와 주권, 그리고 국제 규칙 질서의 미래가 달린 문제다.

이제 한국과 미국 모두가 동맹의 진정한 의미를 되돌아보고, 상호 존중과 민주적 동의에 기반한 관계 재설정에 나설 때다.